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TRANSBORDER SEARCH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT?
NICOLAI SEITZ
Think about the following situation: you are a German
police officer investigating a serious crime. Your suspect is an
American citizen using a Yahoo-e-mail-account to
communicate with his criminal partners. Now you are
informed that critical evidence (an e-mail) was sent to the
suspect's e-mail-account and is currently stored on Yahoo's e-
mail-server in New York. It is Sunday morning and there are
indications that the e-mail will be deleted by the suspect in a
few hours. Traditional methods of gaining access to the vital
evidence, like letters rogatory, might take too long. What do
you do? Is it permissible for you as a German police officer to
hack the suspect's e-mail-account and to download the
incriminating e-mailfrom the server located in New York?
This Article tries to find an answer to the question of
when such a "transborder search" is currently admissible
under public international law. It analyses the first (at least
publicly known) criminal case worldwide in which a law
enforcement agency (the United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation) used this method to access and download
evidence stored on server in a foreign country. After
analysing the current legal situation the author comes to the
conclusion that up to now a transborder search to access
protected data is in principle inadmissible. However, there is
an exception when the data are stored in the United States
and extraordinary circumstances prevail. Therefore, the
author's answer regarding the question above is "yes".
I. TRANSBORDER SEARCH AND THE GORSHKOV-IVANOV
CASE
The Internet confronts prosecuting authorities with
new tasks and opportunities. In transnational prosecutions,
it is more and more frequently the case that the relevant data
for local preliminary investigations and criminal proceedings
are stored on foreign servers. As a result, national
prosecuting authorities are initially barred from direct
2
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physical access to these data.1 The common slogan of the
"unlimited Internet" conceals a significant problem
confronting prosecuting authorities; thus far, there have only
been rudimentary attempts at adequately resolving this
difficulty. 2 An illustrative example of the problems associated
with transnational prosecution of offenses on the Internet is a
case which has recently been heard in the United States and
which serves as the starting point for this essay: the
Gorshkov-Jvanov case. The circumstances of the case were
the following.
Around the end of 1999, certain unauthorized persons
abused the Internet to hack into the networks of twenty
United States businesses, including banks, credit card
institutions, and Internet service providers. The unknown
offenders gained access to credit card numbers and other
information about financial transactions and used these to
commit fraud. In February 2000, one of the affected firms, a
credit report agency, received an e-mail stating that the e-
mail sender had uncovered the "root password" which would
give him unrestricted access to the firm's network. The e-mail
sender threatened to delete all data from all computers
1 In 80% of all German cases in which the Internet plays a
role in committing or carrying out an offense, access to data located
abroad is necessary for the criminal investigations. See
BUNDESJUSTIZMINISTERIUM/ BUNDESINNENMINISTERIUM [GERMANY'S
FEDERAL DEPARTMENT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS/GERMANY'S FEDERAL
DEPARTMENT FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS], PERIODISCHER
SICHERHEITSBERICHT 2001 [Periodical security report 20011 at 204 (2001),
available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Artikel/lix 49371.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004). Similar statistics for arbitrary Internet
research are also mentioned by Germany's Federal Commissioner for
Data Protection, BUNDESDATENSCHUTZBEAUFTRAGTER [FEDERAL
COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION], 18 TXTIGKEITSBERICHT [18th
ACTIVITY REPORT] 105, available at
http://www.bfd.bund.de/information/18tb9900.pdf (83%) (last visited Feb.
20, 2004), as well as by Germany's Federal Criminal Investigation
Agency, BUNDESKRIMINALAMT [FEDERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
AGENCY], BEKAMPFUNG DER KRIMINALITAT IM INTERNET [CRIME COMBAT
ON THE INTERNET] 151 (2000) (citing 80%). Thus, crossing national
borders during the prosecution of Internet crime is no longer the
exception, but the rule.
2 See Peter Dieterle et al., [Information Warfare],
KRIMINALISTIK 2003, 330, 336: "[The prosecution as a task within the sole
responsibility of a nation state fails very quickly when its competences
are confronted with the boundlessness of the Internet.]" For a more
general view, see B. Scheffler, in WOLFGANG KILIAN & BENNO HEUSSEN,
COMPUTERRECHTSHANDBUCH [COMPUTER LAW MANUAL] § 104 n.1 and
Max-Peter Ratzel & Peter Beismann, Der elektronische Handel im
Internet [The Electronic Commerce on the Internet], KRIMINALISTIK 2003,
642, 651 ("[National competences regulating legal matters face
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connected to the network unless the firm hired him as a
security consultant. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI"), which had been called upon to investigate, detected
that the e-mail had been sent from an e-mail account
provided by a Washington-based e-mail service provider
whose network the offenders had also infiltrated. It turned
out that the offenders had used two computers located in
Chelyabinsk (Russia). The owners of the two computers were
the Russian citizens Ivanov and Gorshkov. The FBI
subsequently initiated an operation, code-named "Flyhook"
and, in June 2000, established a pseudo-firm named "Invita"
ostensibly specializing in security consultation for Internet
firms. Invita offered jobs to both of the suspects, but
demanded proof of their qualifications. To demonstrate their
abilities, they were asked to hack into a firm website
specifically created for this purpose. On November 10, 2000,
the two suspects flew to Seattle, where FBI officers posing as
employees of the firm provided computers on which specific
recording programs ("sniffer programs") had been installed.
With the computers, the suspects accessed their servers in
Russia over the Internet, in order to retrieve the locally
stored software which they needed for the demonstration.
The passwords they used to access the servers in Russia were
being recorded by the sniffer program. Ivanov and Gorshkov
were arrested on the same day. Afraid that relevant data
might be deleted in Russia, FBI officers accessed the Russian
servers via the Internet using the obtained passwords. They
downloaded 250 gigabytes of data, including stolen credit
card numbers and other evidence. The two Russians were
charged with multiple misdemeanors, and with the help of
the data downloaded from Russia, they have already been
convicted to fines and prison sentences. 3
3 See United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn.
2001); United States v. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
Brendan I. Koerner, From Russia with LoPHT, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May-June
2002, at 35-38, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-
June2002/featurekoernermayjun2002.html; Press Release, United
States Department of Justice, Russian National Arrested and Indicted
For Penetrating U.S. Corporate Computer Networks, Stealing Credit
Card Numbers, and Extorting the Companies By Threatening to Damage
Their Computers (May 7, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ ivanovlndict.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2004); Press Release, United States Department of Justice,
Russian Computer Hacker Indicted In California For Breaking Into
Computer Systems And Extorting Victim Companies (June 20, 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ivanovlndict2.htm
(last visited Sept. 2004); Press Release, United States Department of
Justice, Russian National Indicted On Computer Intrusion Charges
(August 16, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 4
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At first glance, the case appears to be of little legal
significance. Because of the FBI's creative course of action,
the offenders could be identified, arrested and convicted by a
United States court. Why, then, does the case acquire legal
significance for prosecution authorities outside of the United
States and why is it consequently worthy of closer
examination?
The response is: The case is noteworthy because this is
apparently the first case, worldwide, for whose prosecution
the responsible authorities have employed a "transborder
search" and in which the evidence obtained by means of this
measure provided the basis of the conviction. A transborder
search is defined as a search in which the Internet offers the
opportunity to take unilateral measures to access data which
are stored on servers in third countries, and in which agents
of the state affected by the offense access the data without
asking permission of the state (i.e., by way of a letters
rogatory) in which the data are stored. In the Gorshkov-
Ivanov case, for example, the investigating officers directly
accessed the offenders' servers in Russia from the United
States instead of addressing a letters rogatory to the Russian
authorities. The legal permissibility of such unilateral
measures, used to access data stored on foreign networked
servers from within the affected country, is at the moment
increasingly discussed both nationally and internationally
from the perspective of international law under the keywords
"transborder search" and "transnational search".
The decisive legal question posed by transborder
searches is whether a violation of the international principle
of territoriality is caused by the access to the data stored on
networked computers outside national territory, and if yes,
whether this violation might under certain circumstances be
justified.4 The principle of territoriality in international law
criminal/cybercrime/ivanovlndict3.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004); Press
Release, United States Department of Justice, Russian Computer Hacker
Convicted by Jury (October 10, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/gorshkovconvict.htm (last
visited Sept 13, 2004). See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 4 (2002) [hereinafter SEARCHING
& SEIZING], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/s&smanual2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (discussing
Gorshkov-vanov cases, albeit not with regards to the problem of the
permissibility of transborder searches).
4 For principle of territoriality, see KNUT IPSEN,
VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] § 23 nn.6-10 (4th ed. 1999) (providing
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(alternatively also called the principle of formal
territoriality) 5 categorically forbids a state to undertake a
government act on foreign territory. Access via the Internet
(or, in some cases, also via intranet) to data located on
servers abroad could be held to be a violation of this principle
(for more details, see Part II, infra).6 As a general rule of
international law,7 the principle of territoriality is globally
recognized and to be respected. Thus, if a transborder search
qualifies as an infringement of the principle of territoriality,
the course of action undertaken by the prosecuting
authorities would be improper and, in case of a violation,
would possibly render inadmissible evidence thus gained.8
Answering the question of the permissibility of
transborder search is also significant because letters
rogatories, a traditional instrument of transnational
cooperation, are often ineffective in investigations relating to
the Internet. The disadvantage of letters rogatories is the
long processing time (an average of one year in the case of
Beweisaufnahme im Ausland [Hearing of Evidence AbroacA, Freibug i.Br.
1988, 18.
5 See Rainer Spatscheck, Steuerhinterziehung im Internet
[Tax Evasion on the Internet], StraFo 2000, 1, n.28 (providing further
bibliographic references).
6 It is, however, not a case of transborder search if
prosecuting authorities find a networked computer which is currently
displaying data that is normally stored abroad. The displayed data is then
saved in the interim memory of the computer and therefore on domestic
territory. It is a transborder search, however, if further data, which had
not been in the interim memory, is retrieved. Regarding this matter, also
compare ULRICH SIEBER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME IN
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY - COMCRIME-STUDY 107, n.239, available at
http://europa.eu.int/InternetServiceProvider/legal/en/comcrime/sieber.doc
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004); Ulrich Sieber, Collecting and Using Evidence
in the Field of Information Technology, in ALBIN ESER & JONATAN
THORMUNDSSON, OLD WAYS AND NEW NEEDS IN CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
203, n.25. Sieber suggests that this situation may be a possible
permissible exception from the prohibition of transborder searches.
Strictly speaking, however, this is not a case of transborder search, as the
data is located domestically.
7 See BVerfGE E 63, 343 (361, 373-74); Streinz, in MICHAEL
SACHS, GRUNDGESETZ [BASIC LAW] Art. 25, n.51(f) (3d ed. 2003).
8 For German law, see, e.g., WOLFGANG BAR, DER ZUGRIFF
AUF COMPUTERDATEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN [ACCESS TO COMPUTER DATA IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS] 236; Rainer Spatschek & Jbrg Alvermann,
Steuerfahndung ohne Grenzen? Auslandsermittlungen im Steuer- und
Steuerstrafverfahren [Tax Investigations Without Borders? Foreign
Investigations and Criminal Fiscal Proceedings], IStR 2001, 33, 36;
Spatscheck, supra note 6, at 7; Annette Marberth-Kubicki, Internet und
Strafrecht [Internet and Criminal Law], StraFo 2002, 277, 281. 6
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Italy, and even two years in the case of Spain).9 This is in
conformity with data indicating that international
jurisdiction takes an average of two years to backtrack the
digital traces left by the offender during his/her offense on
the Internet.1 0 For investigations involving the Internet, the
time factor plays a decisive role for several reasons. Many
countries, such as Germany, have recently introduced data
protection provisions under which data relevant as evidence
(such as IP addresses) must be deleted after a certain period
of time. Moreover, punishable contents are often made
accessible on the Internet only for a short period of time,
after which they are deleted. Furthermore, as the time span
increases, there is a growing risk of the offender finding out
about the investigations against him and benefiting from the
ease with which data of evidentiary value may be deleted.11
Finally, it has also occurred in the past that letters rogatories
received no answer at all. 12 Traditional letters rogatories are,
therefore, hardly promising for Internet-related
investigations. 13
9 Cf Rainer Spatscheck & J6rg Spatscheck, Besch]agnahme
und A uswertung von verschlhsselten Computerdaten [Seizure and Survey
of Encrypted Computer Data], PStR 2000, 188, 190.
10 See Krempl, Polizeichef: Internet-Anbieter mtissen
Kundendaten lnger speichern [Chief Police Officer: Internet Service
Firms Must Save Client Data for a Longer Period of Time], in HEISE
ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2001), at http://www.heisenews.de/newsticker/data/jk-
13.08.01-000/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
11 See, e.g., BAR, supra note 9, at 41 (describing a Swiss case
handled by the Public Prosecutor's office in Frankfurt am Main, file no. 92
Js 34528/87, dated 1987. A firm (or, respectively, the senior employees)
from Frankfurt was suspected of having committed investment fraud. A
search of its premises only led to the discovery of a computer terminal
without its own storage device, which was connected to the public
telephone network. The business data was only retrievable by data
telecommunication transfer and was stored on a central processor in
Switzerland. Access via data telecommunication transfer was not
undertaken by the prosecuting authorities (for unknown reasons). The
headquarters of the firm in Monaco had the same access rights as the
firm subsidiary in Frankfurt/Main and initiated the deletion of evidence
while a letters rogatory by German authorities was handled in
Switzerland. However, during a later search subject to the letters
rogatory, authorities were able to confiscate backup copies of the relevant
data.).
12 See Frank Gehde, Verfolgung von Straftaten im Internet
[Persecution of Criminal Offences on the Internet], DuD 2003, 496,499.
13 See Jiirgen P. Graf, Internet: Straftaten und
Strafverfolgung [Internet: Criminal Offences and Criminal Persecution],
DRiZ 1999, 281, 286; see also Hauke Scheffler & Christian Dressler, Die
Insuffizienz des Computerstrafrechts [The Insufficiency of Computer
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Criminals have long known of these advantages and
exploited them for their own purposes. Hackers, for example,
often use several networked intermediary systems when
intruding into foreign networked systems in order to
complicate the detection of the original computer used. If the
intermediary systems include computers located in Italy or
Spain, the probability of obtaining relevant data without
delay tends toward zero. According to German prosecuting
authorities, offenders also relocate pornographic material to
countries in which said material is not prohibited, and
therefore systematically take advantage of divergences in
global criminal legislation. 14
In the past, various transnational institutions and
organizations have made efforts to improve international
cooperation with respect to these difficulties, and the first
successful results can be seen. The Convention on Cybercrime
of the Council of Europe, 15 for example, envisages in Article
35 the establishment of a 24/7-point of contact which will
process letters rogatories around the clock (24 hours, 7 days a
week). Nevertheless, the involvement of a third country to
undertake the desired measure causes time delays which
may, in certain cases, thwart investigatory success or which
can make these appear unacceptable for other reasons. 16 The
14 Cf Peter Wiedemann, Tatwerkzeug Internet [Criminal
Instrument Internet], KRIMINALISTIK 2000, 229.
15 Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature Nov. 23,
2001, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). The convention has
so far been ratified by three countries (Albania, Croatia and Estonia).
Ratification by the United States is still outstanding. President Bush has
recently asked the Senate to consent to the Convention. Press Release,
The White House, Message to the Senate of the United States (Nov. 17,
2003) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/11/20031117- 1.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004)
(announcing therein that the United States had actively participated in
the establishment of the Convention by observation and signed the
Convention on Nov. 23, 2001). The letter further states that the
Convention could be an effective tool to fight cybercrime such as identity
theft and child pornography globally. The ratification of the Convention
would remove barriers on the way toward international cooperation. As a
result, according to President Bush, it could become more difficult for
criminal offenders to retreat to safe places from which to cause damage to
the United States.
16 A good example of this is given by Michael A. Sussmann in
his article, The Critical Challenges From International High-Tech and
Computer-related Crime at the Millennium:
"A hacker, going on-line through the Internet,
breaks into computers that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) uses for air traffic control. He
disrupts a regional air traffic network, and the disruption
causes the crash of a DC-10 in the Rocky Mountains, 8
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only remaining option, then, is to conduct a transborder
search.
II. LEGAL PERMISSIBILITY OF "TRANSBORDER SEARCHES"
The investigating officers in the Gorshkov-Jvanov case
had decided to take this course of action. In the court trials
against the two offenders, however, the question of whether
the officers' approach was permissible according to
international law was not addressed. Even the manual about
electronic evidence distributed by the United States
Department of Justice ("USDOJ"), which also attends to the
implications of a transborder search with respect to
(international) law, does not discuss the Gorshkov-Jvanov
case (in this context).17 The fact that the computers on which
the relevant data were stored were located in Russia and not
killing all aboard. The FAA and the FBI know there has
been a hacker intrusion, originating through the Internet,
but nothing else. Since anyone can access the Internet
from anywhere in the world, the FBI has no idea where the
hacker may be located. Moreover, they do not know the
motive of the attack or the identity of the attackers. Is it a
terrorist group, targeting the United States and likely to
strike again at any time, or is it a fourteen-year-old hacker
whose prank has spun tragically out of control? Within
thirty minutes of the plane crash, the FBI tracks the
source of the attack to an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
in Germany. Assuming the worst, another attack could
occur at any time, and hundreds of planes in flight over the
United States are at risk. The next investigative step is to
determine whether the ISP in Germany is a mere conduit,
or whether the attack actually originated with a subscriber
to that service. In either case, the FBI needs the assistance
of the German ISP to help identify the source of the attack,
but it is now 3:00 a.m. in Germany.
Does the FBI dare wait until morning in Europe to
seek formal legal assistance from Germany or permission
from the German government to continue its investigation
within their borders?
Michael A. Sussmann, The Critical Challenges From
International Higb -Tech and Computer-related Crime at the Millennium,
9 DuKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 451, 453-54 (1999). Similar difficulties also
arise, for example, when a website is "split up", i.e., the data of a website
is not stored on a single server but, comparable to a mosaic, different
parts of the website are stored on servers in various countries, see Scott
Charney, Wir wollen auch far andere Linder eine Fihrungsrolle
einnehmen [ We Also Want to Be a Guide For Other Countries], interview
by Christiane Schulzki-Haddouti, available at http://jya.com/g9-
charney.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
17 See USDOJ, SEARCHING & SEIZING, supra note 4, at 25.
The defense lawyers in Gorshkov have not mentioned this point either.
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in the United States even had a negative effect on the
accused. This was the case because a United States District
Court held that the protection of the United States
Constitution, which applied only within the United States
and only to United States citizens, was not available to
them.18 The need to discuss legal permissibility, however,
was already evident because Russia's Federal Secret Bureau
(FSB), responsible for computer crimes, protested the FBI's
course of action after the procedure had become known. 19
Since then, the FSB has even induced preliminary
proceedings in Russia against the FBI officer leading the
operation, charging him with illegal intrusion into computer
systems. 20 According to an FSB spokesperson, the case is a
matter of principle, as there is the danger that the FBI will
continue to proceed this way in the future. However, the
responsible court as well as the United States government
refuses to allow the arrest of the FBI officer. 21
To answer the question of the international legal
permissibility of a transborder search, it is advisable to first
differentiate whether the transborder search in the third
country aims at the retrieval of generally accessible data or of
data that are not freely accessible. The category of generally
accessible data is comprised of all data which are not subject
to any special pre-conditions. That includes, for example,
access via a "guest account," which is open to everyone. The
Gorshkov-Ivanov case, on the contrary, deals with not freely
accessible data, because the data could only be accessed by
password.
18 See United States v. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026 (W.D.
Wash. 2001).
19 See USA: Russischer Hacker muss drei Jahre in Haft
[USA: Russian Hacker Must Go to Prison For Three Years], in CHIP
ONLINE, at http://www.chip.de/news-stories/news-stories_8863217.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004). However, the Russian government has so far
dispensed with a formal protest. See Koerner, supra note 4, at 38.
20 See FSB charges FBI with Hacking, in RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 16, 2001), at
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/O8/l -RUS/rus- 160802.asp (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004).
21 See id, supra note 21. For his performance in this case, the
leading FBI officer received an award. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, AWARDS FOR OUTSTANDING CRIMINAL AND
COUNTERTERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/seattle.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). 10
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A. TRANSBORDER SEARCHES IN THE CASE OF
GENERALLY ACCESSIBLE DATA
In international literature (no jurisdiction exists so
far), the permissibility of a transborder search with respect to
generally accessible data is currently the subject of
controversial discussion. In part, the compatibility of
transborder searches in the case of generally accessible data
with the international principle of territoriality is affirmed,
22
with strongly varying justifications given. The then-senior
prosecutor at the Federal Court of Germany (BGH) and
current judge at the same court, Jlirgen Graf, for example,
wants to allow transborder searches for reasons of
practicability, based on his belief that a reliable conclusion
about the location of the computer cannot be drawn by the
Uniform Resource Locator (URL).23 Behind this lies the
assumption that, without a transborder search, an
investigation on the Internet could not be conducted at all by
the prosecuting authorities, because an infringement of the
principle of territoriality could never be completely precluded.
Robert Jofer,24 on the other hand, chooses a different
approach. First of all, he declares the traditional concept for
defining an infringement of the principle of territoriality to be
unsuitable. The main argument in favor of a violation of
international law is inapplicable because the officer
undertaking the data retrieval is physically not in foreign
territory. However, he uses technical means to activate a
computer in foreign territory. The decisive criterion thus
cannot be the place of the offense but only the intensity with
which the legal framework of the country from which the
data are retrieved is affected. This, in turn, depends on
whether an intrusion into the individual rights of a foreign
citizen results from the retrieval of generally accessible data.
With respect to the retrieval of generally accessible data, this
is to be rejected because the officer does not undertake any
acts of deception regarding his role as part of a prosecuting
22 For an American point of view, see USDOJ, SEARCHING &
SEIZING, supra note 4, at 25 ("There is general agreement that access to
publicly available materials in Country A, such as those posted to a public
Web site ... are permissible without prior consultations"); For a German
point of view, see Michael Germann, GEFAHRENABWEHR UND
STRAFVERFOLGUNG IM INTERNET [HAZARD CONTROL AND CRIMINAL
PERSECUTION ON THE INTERNET] 652 (1999); ROBERT JOFER,
STRAFVERFOLGUNG IM INTERNET [PROSECUTION ON THE INTERNET] 196
(1996); Jiirgen P. Graf, Befugnisse und Grenzen der Ermittlungsbehirden
[Powers and Boundaries of Prosecution Authorities], DPolB1. 4/2001, 6, 9.
23 See Graf, supra note 23, at 9.
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authority and, comparable to reading a foreign journal,
merely takes advantage of an offer made to the public. By
tolerating the Internet as an institution, the state has
permitted data traffic in its national territory, traffic which
includes the retrieval of data from abroad. Even with respect
to external appearances, a retrieval of generally accessible
data from abroad does not encroach upon the rights of a
citizen; the measure is, rather, comparable to the video
camera recording of illegal border crossings by the border
police.
Michael Germann, too, reaches a similar conclusion,
raising the question of whether the communication of the
officer includes an aspect of national sovereignty. 25 The
communication-based situation suggests a classification with
respect to anonymity: if access is gained to public and
anonymous (i.e., generally accessible) Internet offerings, the
person retrieving data does not arrogate sovereign power. No
country would consider such an investigatory act an
infringement of territorial sovereignty. If the latter
circumstance were not to exclude an intrusion, the
assumption of a justifying toleration should be valid. Finally,
Harald Schaumburg notably goes still a step further with his
view that foreign-oriented intelligence measures conducted
from domestic territory are always permissible because a
physical entry into foreign territory is not undertaken. 26
The opposite view rejects the permissibility of the
retrieval of data from foreign computers even in the case of
generally accessible data.2 7 According to this view, the
25 See GERMANN, supra note 23, at 651.
26 See HARALD SCHAUMBURG, INTERNATIONALES
STEUERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW] § 19.2 (2d ed. 1998) (referring
to investigations in criminal tax proceedings). He mentions as evidence a
ruling by the German Federal Financial Court in Germany, BStBl. III
1959, 181, which itself, however, does not exactly support his view. The
Federal Financial Court states in its ruling that apart from the formal
delivery abroad, the simplified form of delivery of formal official
notifications and rulings by the post office, initiated by a domestic
German authority, is also impermissible because of a violation of the
principle of territoriality. In this way, the Federal Financial Court takes a
stance exactly opposite to Schaumburg's view.
27 See MARCO GERCKE, RECHTSWIDRIGE INHALTE IM
INTERNET [ILLICIT CONTENTS ON THE INTERNET] 171 (2000); Ulrich Sieber,
in THOMAS HOEREN & ULRICH SIEBER, HANDBUCH MULTIMEDIARECHT
[HANDBOOK MULTIMEDIA LAW] § 19, n.736 (2004). The Bundestag, the
German Federal Parliament, also argues in this direction. See BT-Drs.
13/11002, 117 (stating "[Due to the principle of territoriality this [an
access to stored data] is as a rule to be avoided, at any case if the server is
located abroad.]"). The Bundestag does not, however, differentiate
between generally accessible and not freely accessible data. An opposite 12
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principle of territoriality prohibits any form of sovereign
activity by prosecuting authorities in foreign territory
regardless of whether or not it is a measure which includes
an intrusion. 28 The newly arisen possibilities of transfer
resulting from networked systems, with which data
processing can be initiated abroad, would, in the case of a
transborder search, be used like an "extended arm" by the
prosecuting authorities, and the intensity of intrusion is
comparable to that of physical presence in the territory.29 The
right of a state to decide autonomously whether or not
investigations shall be undertaken in its sovereign territory
must not be circumvented with the help of advanced
communications technologies.30 It should be noted that a
particular hazard results from the quantity of data which can
be obtained unnoticed. A retrieval of generally accessible
data does not lead to an infringement of private interests.
However, because the data retrieval contributes to the
execution of a nationally sovereign act, national sovereign
interests are, in the end, also involved.
When considering the problem from a dogmatic
perspective, the solution can be reached by answering two
questions: Is the principle of territoriality affected by the
retrieval of generally accessible data, and if so, does
international law permit such a measure? The literature
precisely emphasizes a particular characteristic of
transborder searches that is relevant to the first question,
namely that the physical presence of the civil servant
representing a foreign country's sovereign power on the
territory of the third country is, unlike in a usual
investigation, not essential. In this respect, the comparison to
the monitoring of foreign territory from a domestic position
suggests itself (for example, by border police officers to
uncover illegal boundary crossings or by intelligence
view without a differentiation between generally accessible and generally
non-accessible data is presented by Rainer Spatscheck. See Spatscheck,
supra note 6, at 7. See also IRINI E. VASSILAKI, MATERIELLES STRAFRECHT,
STRAFPROZESSRECHT, RECHTSINFORMATIK UND
INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT [CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL
LAW, COMPUTER SCIENCE LAW AND INFORMATION SOCIETY] 347, 355
(2002), at http://www.alfred-
buellesbach.de/PDF/33_Vassilaki Materielles.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2004).
28 See GERCKE, supra note 28 at 171. See also Sieber, supra
note 28, § 19, n.736.
29 See BAR, supra note 9, at 235. See also Wolfgang Bdr in
HEINZ-BERNHARD WABNITZ & THOMAS JANOVSKY, HANDBUCH DES
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC AND
FISCAL CRIMINAL LAW] § 25 n.23 (2d ed. 2004).
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satellites). According to conventional wisdom, such
monitoring does not violate the international principle of
territoriality. 31 A closer inspection shows, however, that the
measures are not comparable. Unlike the comparison case, a
transborder search brings about physically perceptible
changes to the outside world in the territory of the third
country because data processing is initiated on servers that
are located in the foreign state. The measure is not restricted,
as in the example of border protection, to pure monitoring of
activities occurring in foreign territory, but in fact initiates
new processes. Thereby it cannot make a difference whether
the acting officer is physically present at the foreign site of
the server when undertaking the measure, or whether he
accesses the server over the Internet or in some cases also
over an intranet. The result of his activity is the same in both
cases: data processing is initiated on servers which are
located in foreign sovereign territory. The decisive criterion to
answer the question whether or not a violation of the
principle of territoriality occurs is thereafter not the physical
presence in foreign sovereign territory but whether the
measure causally precipitates a perceptible change in the
outside world in foreign territory.
The principle of territoriality, including the sole right
of each country to decide whether or not criminal
investigations may be undertaken in its territory, must not
be annulled by novel communication medias such as the
Internet. In a transborder search, the executing officer thus
does not only act domestically, but also abroad. 32 The
principle of territoriality is thereby affected by the execution
of a transborder search, and the question remains open
whether the resulting infringement of national sovereignty is
justified in international law.
With respect to dogmatics, such a justification can
exclusively be derived from recognized legal sources of
international law. As legal sources of international law,
international accords (treaties), international customary law
(practice in law of nations) as well as recognized general legal
principles are to be named. 33 The reasons of practicability
brought forth in the literature are, accordingly, not a
31 See Wolfgang Graf Vitzhum, in WOLFGANG GRAF VITZHUM,
VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] § 1 n.139 (5th ed. 1997).
32 In this respect, the physical presence is replaced by a
"virtual presence". See Wolfgang Kuner, Internationale
Zustfindigkeitskonflikte im Internet [International Jurisdictional
Conflicts on the Internet], CR 1996, 453, 454 (in another context).
33 See IPSEN, supra note 5, §3 n.3; Art. 38 I Statute of the
International Court of Justice. 14
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sustainable basis for justification, nor are the various
classifications of public and anonymous communication or of
the intensity of encroachment on the legal framework of the
affected country. Such differentiations are not based on any
of the recognized legal sources.
The problem of transborder searches has already been
discussed internationally. As early as 1995, the Council of
Europe engaged with the topic of transborder searches within
the framework of a study titled Concerning Problems of
Criminal Procedural Law Connected with Information
Technology.34 The Council of Europe then recommended that
access to internationally stored data by way of networks be
permitted in case immediate action is necessary. 35 The study
became a topical issue again on the occasion of the
preparations for the Convention on Cybercrime, and the
recommendation was taken into consideration in Article 32 of
the Convention on Cybercrime.
Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime, which has
thus far been ratified by thirty-three states, constitutes the
first agreement in international law which attends to the
question of transborder searches. According to Article 32 (a)
of the Convention on Cybercrime, a state may retrieve
generally accessible data independently of the geographical
location of their storage unit without having to ask for the
consent of any other state. 36 A transborder search with
34 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (95) 13 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Problems of
Criminal Procedure Law Connected with Information Technology
(adopted Sept. 11, 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/crycoe.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2004).
35 Council of Europe, supra note 35, Appendix § VII (17):
The power to extend a search to other computer
systems should also be applicable when the system is
located in a foreign jurisdiction, provided that immediate
action is required. In order to avoid possible violations of
state sovereignty or international law, an unambiguous
legal basis for such extended search and seizure should be
established. Therefore, there is an urgent need for
negotiating international agreements as to how, when
and to what extent such search and seizure should be
permitted.
36 Article 32 (a) of the Convention reads "A Party may,
without the authorization of another Party, (a) access publicly available
(open source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is
located geographically." Convention on Cybercrime, opened far signature
Nov. 23, 2001, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
38 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 2004-2005
respect to generally accessible data is, as a result, explicitly
permitted.
However, even without the existence of Article 32 (a) of
the Convention on Cybercrime, the retrieval of generally
accessible data is recognized as part of international
customary law. A pre-condition for the development of
customary law is that a behavior be practiced over a certain
period of time and be considered justifiable by all involved
parties. 37 The examination of data in generally accessible
Internet sources within the framework of a sovereign activity
has been and is practiced daily, without states taking offense
at this practice. 38 This implies that this practice has been
tacitly tolerated and is considered lawful. In this respect,
Article 32 (a) of the Convention on Cybercrime merely
codifies the hitherto existing practice.
Therefore, as a first result, the following can be
recorded: a transborder search is permissible as long as the
access is to generally accessible data.
B. TRANSBORDER SEARCHES IN THE CASE OF
NOT FREELY ACCESSIBLE DATA
However, generally available data are, as a rule,
hardly fruitful for preliminary and criminal proceedings.
Punishable contents or evidence are seldom made accessible
on the Internet without an admission control mechanism.
Consequently, it is more significant to answer the question
37 KARL DOEHRING, VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] § 4
n.286 (1999).
38 E.g., in non-specified Internet investigations by the
German Federal Criminal Office. See Wolfgang Bdr,
Strafverfahrensrechtliche Aspekte der Online-Kommunikation [Criminal
Procedural Aspects of Online-Comm unication], in DETLEF KROGER &
MARC A. GIMMY, HANDBUCH ZUM INTERNET [INTERNET HANDBOOK] 637 (2d
ed. 2002); BUNDESBEAUFTRAGTER FUR DEN DATENSCHUTZ, supra note 1, at
105; Straftaten im Internet - BKA4 sucht illegale Netzinhalte [Offenses on
the Internet - The BKA Searches For Illegal Internet Content], CHIP
ONLINE, at http://www.chip.de/news-stories/news-stories_8934703.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004). Switzerland also undertakes non-specified
Internet investigations to prosecute offenses. See Nick Luethi, Schweizer
Cybercops nehmen Dienst wieder auf [Swiss Cyber Cops Are On Duty
Again], HEISE ONLINE, at
http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/13911/l.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2004); Schweizer Polizei betreibt wieder Internet-Monitoring [Swiss
police is again monitoring the Internet], HEISE ONLINE (Jan. 7, 2003), at
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jk-07.01.03-001/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2004). 16
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whether access to not freely accessible (protected) data is also
permissible. The comments in the literature with respect to
this question are considerably more univocal than in the case
of generally accessible data.
1. PREVALENT VIEW
The strongly predominant view holds that a
transborder search with respect to protected data is
impermissible because of the resulting violation of the
principle of territoriality if no explicit consent is expressed by
the affected state. 39  The procedure violates existing
39 See Rainer Spatscheck & J6rg Alvermann, Internet-
Ermittlungen im Steuerstrafprozess [Internet-Investigations in Criminal
Fiscal Proceedings], wistra 1999, 333, 334; Spatscheck, supra note 6, at 7;
Manfred M6hrenschldger, Internationale Regelungen durch die ,, Cyber-
Crime "-Konvention des Europarates [International Provisions in the
"Cyber-Crime"-Convention of the Council of Europe], in JURGEN WELP,
KRIMINALITAT@NET [CRIME@NET] 97, 110 (2003); Kurt Ringel,
Rechtsprobleme beim Zugriff auf EDV-Beweismittel [Legal Problems
Regarding Access to DP-Evidence], DPolBl. 3/1998, 14, 17 (legal situation
unspecified, "[but most states, including the Federal Republic of
Germany, are likely to see a violation of their sovereignty in a
transnational investigation that has not been permitted]"); Wolfgang Bdr,
supra note 30, § 25 n.23; Dieterle et al., supra note 2, at 337, 345; Hans-
Werner Moritz, Anmerkung zu AG Minchen, Urt. v. 28.05.1998 - 8340
Ds 465 Js 173158/95 [Remarks to AG Miinchen, Decision of 28.05.1998-
8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95, CR 1998, 505, 509; Roland Derksen,
Perspektiven fur eine wirksame Bekampfung von Rechtsradikalis-mus
und Rassismus im Internet [Perspectives for an Effective Combat Against
Right Wing Radicalism and Racism on the Internet], ZFIS 1999, 150, 155;
THE COMPUTER RELATED CRIME RESEARCH UNIT, STUDY FOR EU: STUDY
ON LEGAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO COMBATING CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
PERPETRATED THROUGH ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 3 ("Recommendations")
(2000), at http://europa.eu.int/InternetServiceProviderO/
eif/InternetPoliciesSite/Crime/Study2000/Report.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2004); Gabriele Schm6lzer, Rechtliche Situation der
Informationsregulierung [Legal Situation of Information ControA, in
URSULA MAIER-RABLER ET AL., NETZ OHNE EIGENSCHAFTEN [NET WITHOUT
CHARACTERISTICS; STUDY FOR THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF
SCIENCE AND RESEARCH] 52 (1995); Ulrich Sieber, "Cyberlaw: Die
Entwicklung im deutschen Rech' ["Cyberlaw' The Development in
German Lav, in WILLIAM R. CHESWICK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN,
FIREWALLS UND SICHERHEIT IM INTERNET [FIREWALLS AND INTERNET
SECURITY] 283, 303 (2d ed. 1995); Sieber, Collecting & Using, supra note
7, at 211-12; Sieber, Legal Aspects, supra note 7, at 106 ("[Particular
problems regarding transnational measures. It is unclear in all countries,
which have been examined, whether such activities infringe national
sovereignty or not.]"). In part, however, without a differentiation between
generally accessible data and not freely accessible data. As the then-
Secretary of State in the German Department for Domestic Affairs and
the current German Federal Minister of Justice stated in 2000, in an
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agreements on legal assistance. Thus, in its 1995
recommendation, even the Council of Europe considers
transborder searches to cause an infringement of
international principles, because otherwise the demand40
expressed there for the establishment of an unambiguous
legal basis would have been superfluous. 41
However, two modifications of this maxim are being
discussed. First of all, an exception is considered for the case
in which the person subject to the transborder search agrees
to the data retrieval.42 The majority of voices, however, reject
such an exception, arguing that national sovereignty is not at
the disposition of the individual. 43 Rather, the explicit
consent of the responsible authority of the third country is
needed to make a transborder search permissible in the case
of protected data. 44
The second exception is for so-called "good faith" cases,
in which either the acting prosecuting authority erroneously
assumed the data to be located in its own sovereign territory,
or in which the location of a server was unclear or could not
"[affect the national sovereignty of our country and possibly the basic
rights of individual citizens.]" Interview by Christiane Schulzki-Haddouti
with Brigitte Zypries (2000). Whether or not the modification is
considered permissible with respect to international law cannot, however,
be concluded from the statement. See also Steffen Wettig,
Verantwortlichkeit im Netz - Wer haftet woftir? [Responsibility on the
Net - Who is Liable For What.1, JurPC Web-Dok. 124/2003, 4, at
http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20030124.htm (Jfilrgen P. Graf, judge of the
Federal Court of Germany, stating "[transnational investigations and
online-searches and seizures are currently unthinkable.])" (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004).
40 See Council of Europe, supra note 35, Appendix § VII (17).
41 Bar, supra note 39, at 651; Bar, supra note 30, § 25 n.25.
42 See USDOJ, SEARCHING & SEIZING, supra note 4, at 25
(stating "There is general agreement that . . . access to materials in
Country A with the consent of the owner/custodian of those materials, are
permissible without prior consultations."). In German literature, see Kurt
Ringel, supra note 40, at 17.
43 Moritz, supra note 40, at 509; Spatscheck, supra note 6, at
7; Spatscheck & Alvermann, supra note 39, at 334; Jens Gruhl,
"Grenzenlose" Ermittlungen im lnternet? ['Boundless" Investigations on
the Internet.i, in WELP, supra note 40, at 67, 73. For prosecuting
measures generally, see KLAUS TIPKE & HEINRICH WILHELM KRUSE,
ABGABENORDNUNG [FISCAL CODE] § 117 n.3 (2004); Spatschek &
Alverman, supra note 9, at 33; SCHAUMBURG, supra note 27, §19.2.
44 Spatscheck & Alvermann, supra note 40, at 334
(considering a transborder search impermissible, even if German
investigating officers undertake an investigation when it is beknown to
the other country, and they require an explicit consent of the responsible
court of the third country at the least). 18
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be identified with certainty. 45 One argument in favor of this
is that otherwise the acting state would have to significantly
renounce its executive power in its own sovereign territory.46
An international obligation to refrain from state activity
which could indirectly also have transnational effects
restricts the territorial sovereignty of the acting country too
much, because international law does not intend to reduce
the exercise of state authority within a country. A use of
foreign telecommunications systems cannot be excluded with
certainty even for the case that both communicating partners
are in the territory of a given country.
Wolfgang Bdir, notably, goes even one step further. 47
While in his view, too, the principle of territoriality is
violated, he nevertheless argues that the preliminary storage
of data is always permissible in order to gain time to seek the
affected state's permission to use the data in concrete
criminal proceedings. Thus, even if prosecuting authorities
know that the data are stored in another state, according to
this view, access to these data and the subsequent
preliminary storage is permissible until a decision has been
reached by the affected country.
2. OPPOSITE VIEW
The opposite view, which considers a transborder
search permissible even for the case of not freely accessible
data, is, in German literature, only supported by Olaf von
Briehl and Dirk Ehlscheid. 48 In this view, provided that the
data access by the prosecuting authorities does not go beyond
that of the concerned permittee, the intensity of intrusion is
so low, given the lack of the officer's physical presence on
foreign territory, that the transborder search cannot be
considered to be an infringement of foreign sovereignty. The
45 See GERMANN, supra note 23], at 644, 654; COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME EXPLANATORY REPORT n.191,
a vailable at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/projets/
FinalCyberRapex.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); Ulrich Sieber, Legal
Aspects, supra note 7, n.239; Sieber, Collecting & Using, supra note 7,
n.25.
46 See GERMANN, supra note 23, at 644, 654.
47 See Bdr, supra note 30, § 25 n.23.
48 OLAF G. VON BRIEL & DIRK EHLSCHEID,
STEUERSTRAFRECHT [CRIMINAL TAX LAW] 451-52 (2d ed. 2001); probably
S6nke Hilbrans, Verfassungskonflikte im Cyberspace [Constitutional
Conilicts in Cyberspace], Datenschutz Nachrichten 2/2001, 16, 18
(according to which "[the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty is
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two authors are supported especially in international
literature, where the commencement of a transborder search
under certain pre-conditions is demanded in many
instances. 49 Michael Sussmann, for example, considers a
transborder search to be permissible in the existence of
"exigent circumstances," such as acute danger to life. 50
The views of Jack Goldsmith go in the same
direction.5 1 The starting point of his deliberation is the
statement that technological changes, as they occur, alter the
understanding of the normative significance of territorial
sovereignty. In addition, the practice nowadays recognized by
international law is that a nation may regulate activities in
another nation if the activities in the third country cause
local harm in the regulating country. An example of this is
the regulation of foreign markets by United States antitrust
legislation before World War II. This regulation was then
considered, particularly by European states, to be an
impermissible encroachment on their national sovereignty.
Over the years a paradigm shift has taken place, and by now
the regulation of foreign markets in connection with a
domestic issue is considered internationally impermissible.
International positions with respect to cybercrime have gone
in a similar direction. In the case of a transnational
cybercrime with a subsequent transborder search, a mutual
violation of the principle of territoriality occurs, one
committed by the state in which the criminal activity took
49 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GEMEINSAMER STANDPUNKT
[COMMON POINT OF VIEW] 1 (May 27, 1999), Official Paper EG L 142
(June 5, 1999) (commenting on the negotiations in the Council of Europe
about the agreement on cybercrime and allowing exceptional cases such
as certain severe criminal offenses); ABRAHAM SOFAER ET AL., CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, A PROPOSAL FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CYBER CRIME AND TERRORISM 14 at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/ resources/cybercrime/stanford/cisac-
draft.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). Article 6(5) of the proposal reads
States Parties shall be free to engage in
reasonable, electronic methods of investigation of conduct
covered by Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention, over which
they have jurisdiction to prosecute under Article 5, even if
such conduct results in the transfer of electronic signals
into the territory of other States Parties. A State Party
aware that its investigative efforts will likely result in
such transfers of electronic signals shall as soon as
practicable inform all affected States Parties of such
efforts.
50 Sussmann, supra note 17, at 471 (giving a hypothetical
involving air traffic).
51 See Jack Goldsmith, Cybererime and Jurisdiction, at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cybercrime-and- jurisdiction.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2004). 20
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place, and the other by the state in which damage was caused
by the activity and which attempts to prevent this with the
help of unilateral extraterritorial measures. The toleration
and acquiescence, respectively, of damaging activity in a
state's own territory is as much an infringement of
sovereignty as the violated country's retrieval of the data
created by the activity and relevant as evidence. Under
special circumstances, a transborder search should therefore
be permissible.
3. OWN PERSPECTIVE
There are several problems with the argument in
subpart B(2). First, it is impossible to speak of acquiescence
to the criminal activities. Already, the existence of criminal
laws such as § 202 of the German criminal code or § 271 of
the Swiss criminal code, which declare the damaging action
(i.e., "hacking") to be liable to punishment, shows that states
in which the damaging activity is initiated do not express
toleration, but instead, disapprove of the behavior. Second,
the damaging activity is furthermore conducted by private
individuals, so that holding a state responsible for that
behavior is at least difficul. A mutual violation of the
international principle of territoriality is therefore almost
unthinkable and cannot serve as a justification for
transborder searches. Even if one were to construct a
violation of international law by referring to "toleration," this
tort does not inevitably legitimize further violation of
international law.
The von Briel/Ehlscheid view, which holds that
transborder searches are merely a low-intensity
encroachment, is not convincing either. The existence of
norms, expressed by statutes such as § 202 of the German
criminal code or § 271 of the Swiss criminal code, which
address transborder searches, already demonstrates that
transborder searches are perceived to be an encroachment of
high intensity. The de minimis level beneath which the von
Briehl/Ehlscheid view would apparently like to locate
transborder searches is certainly exceeded.
The standard for the international evaluation of
transborder searches with respect to protected data must
rather, as in the case of generally accessible data, be based on
the question of whether the legal sources of international law
permit such a measure. Should this be the case, then
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because then, following the will of the subjects of
international law, agreements on legal assistance are to be
considered and interpreted as subordinate to the disagreeing
legal sources.
In again consulting Article 32 of the Convention on
Cybercrime, one will notice that, in contrast to the question
of access to generally accessible data, and contrary to the
previous recommendation of the Council of Europe, the access
to not freely accessible data remains unregulated. Article 32
(b) of the Convention on Cybercrime only establishes that, in
the case that consent of the legally authorized person has
been given, prosecuting authorities are permitted to access
stored data.52 This is remarkable because a legal definition of
"authorized person" is neither given by the Convention on
Cybercrime itself nor by the explanatory report. The
explanatory report states, for example, that the authorized
person must be defined according to the respective
circumstances and the applicable law of each individual
case. 53 One example given is a situation in which an e-mail
service provider has saved a private e-mail in a state other
than the state of origin. According to the justification given,
the e-mail service provider could possibly be regarded as an
authorized person in the sense of Article 32 (b) of the
Convention because the storage abroad is a consequence of
the provider's will.
The term "authorized persons" is consequently not
restricted to the affected person from whom the data stem. It
may include third persons if the storage abroad results from
their will and not from the will of the affected person, and if
these third persons de facto have access to the data. Under
Article 32(b), AOL Deutschland (Germany), which stores all
52 Article 32 (b) of the Convention reads
A Party may, without the authorization of another
Party, (b) access or receive, through a computer system in
its territory, stored computer data located in another
Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary
consent of the person who has the lawful authority to
disclose the data to the Party through that computer
system.
53 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 46, n.294 (explaining
that "[w]ho is a person that is 'lawfully authorized' to disclose data may
vary depending on the circumstances, the nature of the person and the
applicable law concerned. For example, a person's e-mail may be stored in
another country by a service provider, or a person may intentionally store
data in another country. These persons may retrieve the data and,
provided that they have the lawful authority, they may voluntarily
disclose the data to law enforcement officials or permit such officials to
access the data, as provided in the Article."). 22
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e-mails in the United States for cost reasons 54 could, for
example, consent to retrieve e-mails from the United States
and (if the conditions for the relevant legal basis are fulfilled)
to hand them over to the German prosecuting authorities
without the need for a letters rogatory from Germany to the
United States or the explicit consent of the responsible
United States authorities. However, Article 32 (b) does not
provide a basis for the coercion of an authorized person like
AOL Germany to retrieve the e-mail from abroad. The
Convention explicitly requires consent, which by definition
contains an element of voluntariness. This applies even if the
pre-conditions of the bases of national intervention are
fulfilled, which, as a rule, stringently provide for a release of
data, as national norms in and of themselves cannot justify a
violation of international law.
The question remains of what influence and to what
application range the Convention on Cybercrime has on the
situation of international law under different possible
constellations of consent. Article 32 (b) at least binds the
signatory states with respect to international law. It is
possible that Article 32 (b), as the result of widely recognized
national practices, is thus binding even to non-signatory
states as an exercise of international law. The validity of this
conclusion depends upon a broadly scattered and
representative participation in drafting the treaty, including
states whose interests are particularly affected. 55 Much
speaks in favor of finding these markers of an international
exercise in the Convention: the high number of signatory
states, the importance of the signatory states (in which a
large part of the infrastructure of the Internet, including
storage capacity, is located),56 as well as the fact that thus
far, no caveats regarding Article 32 (b) have been expressed
by non-signatory states. 57 Considering the mentioned factors,
it can thus be assumed that Article 32 (b) is the result of
(newly emerged) international customary law. At the same
54 Sussmann, supra note 17, n.70.
55 See International Court of Justice, lCJ Reports 1969, 3,
(41 et seq., n.70 et seq.); MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, VOLKERRECHT
[INTERNATIONAL LAW] § 16 n.9 (2d ed. 2002).
56 It is a recognized circumstance that in addition to the
number, the importance of the states is also significant for the evaluation
of whether an exercise of international law exists. See generally
DOEHRING, supra note 38, § 4 n.291 (providing further bibliographic
references); HERDEGEN, supra note 57, § 16 n.3 (for the parallel case of
aerospace law).
57 The assumption of a corresponding tacit toleration
therefore suggests itself; regarding the possibility of the development of
an international exercise by way of tacit toleration, see DOEHRING, supra
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time, Article 32 (b) does away with the dispute over whether
the consent of the affected person is by itself sufficient for
undertaking a transborder search or whether, in addition,
the consent of the responsible authority of the third country
is needed. In the application range of the Convention, Article
32 (b) answers the question in favor of the former.
Consequently, a sufficient basis for a transborder search is
provided by either the consent of the affected person or of an
authorized person in the sense of Article 32 (b).58
However, Article 32 does not address the group of
transborder searches that is most important in practical
considerations: the retrieval of not freely accessible data by a
prosecuting authority without the consent (or even
knowledge) of an authorized person or of the affected country.
At the same time, as early as 1995, the Council of Europe
proposed the creation of an unambiguous international
covenant to avoid international conflicts concerning this
matter, and because most states (at least they did at that
time) tended to regard this as a violation of sovereignty. 59
According to one member, the G-8 High Tech Crime
Subgroup had only shortly thereafter agreed on situations
(that were not further specified) in which a transborder
search should be permissible without a letters rogatory from
the affected country.6 0 The governments of the EU member
states had also established a common position regarding
transborder searches in the Council of Europe, anticipating
the negotiations regarding the Convention on Cybercrime.
Their position provided that a transborder search for the
prosecution of the most severe offenses (to be determined in
each individual case) should be permissible in exceptional
cases, especially in the case of emergencies. 61 As examples of
58 Without Article 32 (b) of the Convention on Cybercrime,
however, the consent of the affected person alone would not suffice
according to international principles, because an infringement of national
sovereignty can only be endorsed by the responsible authorized state
authority. A search and seizure of an accused person's apartment at
his/her domicile abroad is, for example, not made internationally
permissible by the consent of the apartment's owner. In this respect, one
would here have to concede to the currently dominant view, if Article 32
(b) of the Convention on Cybercrime did not exist.
59 See Council of Europe, supra note 35, Appendix § VII (17);
Council of Europe, supra note 47, n.189.
60 See Sussmann, supra note 17, n.147 (citing Scott
Charney).
61 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 51, at 1. Article 1(7)
reads
[A] transborder computer search for the purpose
of the investigation of a serious criminal offense, to be
further defined in the Convention, may be considered in 24
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such emergencies, they suggested the impending deletion or
alteration of evidence, or the prevention of an offense which
could lead to a person's death or cause severe injuries to a
person. 62 Initially, this position was largely supported by the
"Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyberspace," a think tank
which had been established in the process of devising the
Convention on Cybercrime.6 3 In the course of the negotiations
regarding the Convention it became evident, however, that
the participating states would not be able to commit to a
binding provision. Finally, the states refrained from
establishing a provision going beyond Article 32, because, on
the one hand, there was a lack of appropriate previous
experience and, on the other hand, a solution satisfying all
interests often depends on the specific circumstances of each
individual case, which makes the compilation of generally
formulated regulations difficult.64
Consequently, Article 32 of constitutes the lowest
common denominator on which the states involved in the
establishment of the Convention could agree. As a result, a
reverse conclusion is obtrusive, namely that all transborder
searches that are not addressed in Article 32 of the
Convention on Cybercrime are impermissible with respect to
international law. This conclusion is, however, averted by
Article 39, which states that none of the provisions laid down
in the Convention shall affect or impair other rights.65 From
exceptional cases, and in particular where there is an
emergency, for example, as far as necessary to prevent the
destruction or alteration of evidence of the serious offense,
or to prevent the commission of an offense that is likely to
result in the death of or serious physical injury to, a
person.
62 See, e.g., Sieber, Collecting & Using, supra note 7, n.25;
Sieber, Legal Aspects, supra note 7, n.239 (discussing this situation as a
further possible and permissible exception from the prohibition of
transborder searches).
63 See Dietrich Neumann, Review on the Instruments of the
European Union to Combat Computer Crime and Overview of the
Negotiations of the Draft Cyber Crime Convention of the Council of
Europe in Strasbourg, at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/review on the instruments of the.ht
m (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
64 Council of Europe, supra note 47, n.293 (stating "The
drafters ultimately determined that it was not yet possible to prepare a
comprehensive, legally binding regime regulating this area. In part, this
was due to a lack of concrete experience with such situations to date; and,
in part, this was due to an understanding that the proper solution often
turned on the precise circumstances of the individual case, thereby
making it difficult to formulate general rules.").
65 Article 39(3) of the Convention reads "Nothing in this
Convention shall affect other rights, restrictions, obligations and
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the existence of Article 32, one can thus neither conclude the
impermissibility nor the permissibility of transborder
searches not regulated therein. With the exception of the
possible different constellations of consent, Article 32 (b) of
the Convention consequently does not offer a response to the
question of to what extent a transborder search of or for
protected data is permissible under international law.
Because of the lack of additional international treaties
or agreements, the only additional recourse is to examine
international exercise and practice in order to determine
whether and when a transborder search in the case of not
freely accessible data is permissible. For this purpose, the
Gorshkov-Ivanov case, described earlier, constitutes a classic
example. The FBI's course of action in the Gorshkov-Ivanov
case allows the conclusion that the United States obviously
considers a transborder search a permissible (with respect to
international law) prosecutory tool in exceptional cases, such
as, ones involving the threat of deletion of evidence of a
severe criminal offense. This conclusion is supported by a
statement in the USDOJ's manual about electronic evidence,
according to which the consent of the responsible foreign
authority is principally to be sought,66 but which also states
that extraordinary situations such as terrorist threats could,
in certain circumstances, open up the possibility of a non-
consensual or pre-consensual transborder search.67 Russia,
on the other hand, apparently holds the opposite view, and
appears to reject transborder searches. This position is
demonstrated by Russia's reactions to the FBI's actions in the
Gorshkov-lvanov case. Accordingly, it is currently not (yet)
possible to speak of a (at least largely) standardized
international practice or exercise. It is thus to be noted that a
transborder search in the case of not freely accessible data
cannot rest upon international exercise and practice. A
transborder search in this respect is (apart from the possible
different constellations of consent) fundamentally
impermissible, for want of adequate recognition by one of the
legal sources of international law.
This means that the Russian territorial sovereignty
was violated by the United States in the Gorshkov-Ivanov
case. Therefore, a statement about the influence of the
illicitly obtained (with respect to international law) evidence
n.293 ("stating that Article 39, paragraph 3 provides that other situations
are neither authorized, nor precluded.").
66 See USDOJ, SEARCHING & SEIZING, supra note 4, 25.
67 See id. at 27 (absolutely in line with Sussmann's airplane
example, supra note 17 at 453-54). 26
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would have been appropriate, at least during the conviction
of the two offenders by United States district courts
(exclusionary rule regarding the obtained data, ground for
mitigation, etc).
An exception from the exclusionary rule applies,
however, if the data are stored in the United States and if
particular circumstances prevail. The United States assumes
that a transborder search is allowed by international law in
exceptional cases (whose exceptional character is defined by
the United States). While this is unfounded, it shows that the
United States would agree to a transborder search procedure
in its territory in exceptional circumstances. From the actions
taken in the Gorshkov-Ivanov case and from the
corresponding statements in the USDOJ's manual of
electronic evidence, one can conclude that the United States
generally consents to transborder searches even with respect
to not freely accessible data, if extraordinary circumstances
prevail.68 If another country then makes use of this option,
this state would show through its action that it, too, would
tolerate such a course of action in an exceptional case. The
Gorshkov-Ivanov case could, in this respect, mark the
beginning of the establishment of an international practice or
exercise, with which a transborder search with respect to
protected data is internationally legally accepted in
exceptional cases.
Beyond this, there are no further exceptions from the
principle of international impermissibility of transborder
searches with respect to not freely accessible data. This also
applies for the so-called "good faith" cases, because neither an
adequate international treaty nor an international practice or
exercise tolerating such a course of action exists - however
desirable they may be. Therefore, if it becomes evident later
that the principle of territoriality has been violated by the
actions of prosecuting authorities, these actions remain
contrary to international law. In that case, there exists a
possibility of restituting the violation retrospectively, namely
by way of an inquiry to the affected state about whether the
data may be used. It is, however, impermissible to first access
the data for the purpose of a preliminary backup and to only
68 See Koerner, supra note 4, at 38 (quoting S. Granick as
saying "Basically, the ruling says that our police officers can obtain
unauthorized access to a computer for law-enforcement purposes, despite
the fact that it is overseas or under the jurisdiction of another country...
That could come back to haunt us, when foreign police log onto our
citizens' computers in America to take evidence to try them under their
laws. Russian intelligence agents, for example, might now feel at liberty
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afterwards ask the affected state for permission to utilize the
data obtained in violation of international law. This would be
a knowing and deliberate violation of effective (international)
law, from which prosecuting authorities are enjoined under
any circumstances, as they are responsible to the law.
III. FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
The improvements in international cooperation
introduced by the Convention on Cybercrime will
considerably increase the chances of convicting an offender if
he or she leaves behind relevant evidence abroad while
committing offenses using the Internet. Despite these
improvements, the current situation with respect to
unilateral measures is unsatisfactory for cases in which
particular exceptional situations make it necessary to rapidly
access data stored abroad that is not freely accessible. In
these cases, it would be desirable to quickly reach an
international, ideally laid out in a protocol supplementary to
the Convention on Cybercrime (similar to the supplementary
anti-racism protocol). However, it will probably not be
possible to implement a contractual agreement of this kind in
the near future. In the meantime, an international legal
practice corresponding to the principles of the Gorshkov-
Ivanov case could arise, which would be a welcome
development. But for now, transborder searches with respect
to protected data are, in principle, impermissible.
28
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